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Abstract
In 2015–2016, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services led 23 U.S. Government 
(USG) agencies including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and more than 
120 subject matter experts in conducting an in-depth review of the U.S. core public health 
capacities and evaluation of the country’s compliance with the International Health Regulations 
using the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) methodology. This two-part process began with a 
detailed “self-assessment” followed by a comprehensive independent, external evaluation 
conducted by 15 foreign assessors. In the Radiation Emergencies Technical Area, on a scale from 
1-lowest to 5-highest, the assessors concurred with the USG self-assessed score of 3 in both of the 
relevant indicators. The report identified 5 priority actions recommended to improve the USG 
capacity to handle large-scale radiation emergencies. CDC is working to implement a post-JEE 
roadmap to address these priority actions in partnership with national and international partners.
INTRODUCTION
In 2015–2016, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services led 23 U.S. Government 
(USG) agencies including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and more 
than 120 subject matter experts in conducting an in-depth review of the U.S. core public 
health capacities and evaluation of the country’s compliance with the International Health 
Regulations using the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) methodology. The objective of the 
USG JEE was to assess USG capacities and capabilities relevant for the 19 technical areas of 
the JEE tool in order to provide baseline data to support USG’s efforts to reform and 
improve its public health security.
The JEE uses a peer-to-peer process, and as such, is a collaborative effort between host 
country experts and JEE team members. The entire external evaluation, including 
discussions around the scores, the strengths, the areas that need strengthening, best practices, 
challenges and the priority actions should be collaborative, with JEE team members and host 
country experts seeking full agreement on all aspects of the final report findings and 
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recommendations. This two-part process began with a detailed “self-assessment” followed 
by a comprehensive independent, external evaluation conducted by 15 foreign assessors.
The U.S. Government has a robust approach to prepare for and respond to radiological and 
nuclear emergencies. The USG provides assistance and support to state and local 
governments as needed on the premise that events would be handled at the local level until 
they exceed the capability of the local jurisdiction.
The National Response Framework (1) contains the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to 
the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (NRIA) (2), which 
outlines the roles, responsibilities and authorities for the federal agencies during a 
radiological emergency response. The capabilities/capacities of state and local governments 
vary widely across the USA, with the greatest resources found in states that have nuclear 
power plants. The overall coordination of response to any significant radiological/nuclear 
emergency would be carried out by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in close coordination with the White 
House National Security Council. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) would also 
take lead actions if the incident were the result of terrorism or other federal crimes. The 
USG is a signatory to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The USG, like most other nations, would be challenged to respond to a large-scale, 
catastrophic nuclear emergency. Evaluation and testing of the identified roles and 
responsibilities of authorities as described in the NRIA, and its regular updating would be of 
value. Mechanisms can be established for systematic information exchange between 
radiological competent authorities and human health service units. Management of 
radiological and nuclear waste with the development of a long-term repository mechanism 
and appropriate monitoring systems is crucial for radiation safety. Finally, there is a trend in 
the decreasing number of radiation and radiobiology professionals.
CDC is a primary partner with the World Health Organization (WHO) in the development 
and implementation of Joint External Evaluations (JEEs) and post-JEE national action 
planning. CDC, working with numerous federal partners conducted the JEE process in two 
stages; (1) an initial self-evaluation using the JEE tool (3) and (2) an in-country evaluation 
and review conducted by a Joint External Evaluation Team of subject matter experts (4).
Indicators and scores
The JEE tool is comprised of 19 capacity elements or technical areas grouped into the 
following categories: “Prevent” (P), “Detect” (D), and “Respond” (R). Other International 
Health Regulations (IHR)-Related Hazards and Points of Entry indicators were labeled as 
“Points of Entry” (PoE), “Chemical Events” (CE) and “Radiation Emergencies” (RE). Table 
1 4 shows the indicators and scores for the technical areas within “Other IHR hazards and 
points of entry”, where the scores for the Radiation Emergencies category are listed.
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In the Radiation Emergencies Technical Area, on a scale from 1-lowest to 5-highest, the 
assessors concurred with the USG self-assessed score of 3 in both of the relevant indicators. 
For Indicator #1 (RE.1), the USG offered the following remarks for its self-assessed score: 
“There are numerous guidelines, internal plans and protocols. However, there is not 
“systematic information exchange between radiological competent authorities and human 
health surveillance units” required for higher score of 4.” For Indicator #2 (RE.2), the USG 
offered the following remarks for its self-assessed score: “There are explicit indicators, 
plans, communication protocols, and participates in frequent radiation-related drills and 
exercises, etc. However, there have not been realistic drills to evaluate its ability to assist and 
support state and local Community Reception Center and associated Population Monitoring 
activities in its response to a RDD or IND.” A discussion of strengths and best practices as 
well as areas that need strengthening/challenges for those indicators where USG scored 3 is 
provided below.
Strengths/best practices for Indicator #1
• Radiation detection exists in the USG with defined responsibilities of various 
authorities – The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for 
radiation contamination assessment and monitoring in the environment; DHS is 
responsible for the BioWatch system(3), multiple agencies like the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
monitor consumer products with laboratory support; the Department of Energy 
(DOE) and the EPA monitor the radiation resulting from the incident and 
measure environmental radiation through aerial measuring system.
• There is a comprehensive system of protection in place for radiological and 
nuclear hazards with scalable national response plans.
• The capacity for conducting public health risk assessments and mechanisms for 
exposure assessments are in place (CDC provides assistance and support to state 
and local governments for monitoring of the exposed population and post-
incident health surveillance. DOE led Federal Radiological Monitoring and 
Assessment Center (FRMAC) coordinates the collection and assessment of 
environmental radiological data immediately after an emergency).
• Regular exercises allow federal, state and local agencies, as well as nuclear 
power operators, to test both national and local plans, and maintain a level of 
readiness through integrated communication and capabilities across all levels and 
sectors.
• Mechanisms have been developed for mitigation and treatment following 
radiation incidents (such as various guidance documents published by FDA; and 
the Radiation Injury Treatment Network (RITN) to care for patients during 
radiation events with guidance on various possible incidents).
• Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) and the 
Department of Defense’s (DoD) Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 
serve as medical resources.
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• The DHS FEMA RadResponder network(4)enables organizations to rapidly and 
securely record, share and aggregate large quantities of data while managing 
their equipment, personnel, interagency partnerships and multijurisdictional 
event spaces.
Areas that need strengthening/challenges for Indicator #1
• There is a need to assess human health risk by characterizing the impact of 
radiation emergencies on humans.
• There is a very limited capacity of laboratories to conduct bioassays for internal 
radioactive contamination or biodosimetry for the assessment of external 
radiation exposure.
• A system for information exchange is required between radiological competent 
authorities and human health surveillance units.
Strengths/best practices for Indicator #2
• The NRIA outlines the roles, responsibilities and authorities for federal agencies 
during radiation emergencies (federal government provides assistance and 
support to state and local government as needed).
• Various stakeholders play a crucial role in the management of radiation 
emergencies (such as FRMAC, which is coordinated by National Nuclear 
Security Administration in the DOE and supported by other federal, state and 
local agencies; the Advisory Team for the Environment, Food and Health (5), 
comprising technical representatives from EPA, FDA, CDC and USDA; state and 
local response agencies including radiation control programs).
• A well-developed network of assets and plans exists for sampling, monitoring 
and assessing risks to the food supply and the environment.
• The USG has used lessons learned from regular exercises and various incidents 
to refine strategies and set up priorities (lessons learnt from the Fukushima 
incident particularly on radiation detection equipment and the risk 
communication to the public are essential).
• The CDC National Center for Environmental Health (Division of Environmental 
Hazards and Health Effects/Radiation Studies Branch) and the DOE REAC/TS 
are collaborating centers for radiation emergencies with the WHO Radiation 
Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network.
Areas that need strengthening/challenges for Indicator #2
• Evaluate and test the identified roles and responsibilities of authorities as 
described in the NRIA, and where appropriate, update them.
• Improve the availability and sustainability of experienced radiation and 
radiobiology professionals.
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• Conduct realistic wide-scale drills that test the ability of state and local 
communities to assist and support during a radiological or nuclear emergency.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES
There were five priority actions recommended to improve the United States’ capacity to 
handle large-scale radiation emergencies. Those include:
1. Establish mechanisms for systematic information exchange between authorities 
of the radiological competent and human health service surveillance units,
2. Develop a long-term waste management repository following the cleanup of a 
radiological spill,
3. Research, develop and implement systems to create novel, high-throughput 
systems that are capable of performing biodosimetry and bioassay in both mass 
casualty and large-scale radionuclide dispersion situations,
4. Implement the recommendations in the report “Where are the radiation 
professionals?” (Statement No. 12) issued by the National Council on Radiation 
Protection and Measurements in 2015 (6) and
5. Integrate triage systems and population monitoring guidance with the existing 
national public health and clinical systems in order to provide a national capacity 
for continuity of assessment, care and treatment.
There are a number of challenges and opportunities to improve the United States capacity to 
handle a large-scale radiation emergency. Currently, very few laboratories can conduct large-
scale Public Health rapid bioassays for internal radioactive contamination or biodosimetry 
for the assessment of external radiation exposure of the general public. Without those 
capabilities, it would be very difficult in a large-scale incident to determine an appropriate 
initial course of medical management as well as to make optimal use of limited medical 
resources. Research and development are needed to create novel, high-throughput systems 
that are capable of performing biodosimetry in mass casualty situations, as well as novel 
medical countermeasures that can be manufactured and stored in large quantities. In 
addition, new triage systems should be networked with the existing public health and clinical 
systems in order to provide a national capacity for continuity of care and treatment. On the 
environmental side, there are some laboratory capabilities for the detection of radiological 
contamination in food, water, and other environmental media, but those are not widespread 
and their combined capacity may not be sufficient to address the overwhelming demand.
Another previously identified challenge for the United States is a decline in the availability 
of radiation and radiobiology professionals similar to that observed in the rest of the world. 
In a large-scale response situation, incident managers at various levels and operational teams 
may not have immediate access to people with the training and experience to accurately 
assess a dynamic situation and make recommendations. Additionally, there are not enough 
scientists in the “development pipeline” to replace those who have retired or will retire soon. 
Such a shortfall foreshadows a significant gap in the U.S. research and development sector. 
To address the gaps in the availability of qualified radiation professionals, the National 
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Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (6) suggested the need for a national 
effort to increase research funding for low-dose radiation research to spur interest in 
advanced degrees among baccalaureates. The Council also suggested that existing radiation 
science laboratories could look for opportunities to support a larger number of trainees 
earlier in the educational cycle, such as through internships and fellowships, to provide 
radiation-degree candidates with opportunities to gain hands-on experience.
Under the NRIA of the NRF (2), monitoring of people for potential radionuclide 
contamination is primarily a state and local responsibility. In 2007, CDC issued 
comprehensive guidance to public health departments on how to organize a population-
monitoring program (7). This guidance was revised in 2014 (8). However, a 2010 survey by 
the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) revealed that only three of 37 
responding states (8%) reported adequate resources to conduct population-based exposure/
contamination monitoring and most states reported insufficient equipment and health 
physics expertise to assess exposure and to interpret monitoring data (9). In addition, the 
Association of Public Health Laboratories 2014 survey of Public Health laboratories (10) 
found that of the 21 state labs that test for environmental samples and 16 state labs that test 
for food samples, only one tests clinical samples with limited sample throughput and no 
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA - https://wwwn.cdc.gov/clia/) 
compliant methods for a few of the priority threat radionuclides.
INITIATIVES TO FILL IDENTIFIED GAPS
CDC has a multi-year research and development plan to address the need to create and 
disseminate radiobioassay and radiobiodosimetry systems, as well as medical 
countermeasures for radiation exposure, that can be deployed across the country for rapid 
responses to exposures. The plan includes development of bioassay tests for the remaining 
priority radionuclides as well as a plan to disseminate the tests to surge labs once funding is 
identified to create a network of bioassay surge capacity laboratories.
To address the goal to develop a “National systems” approach to radiation event 
management that links medical triage, diagnostic/prognostic data, treatment plans, and long-
term follow-up, CDC is working with partners to develop a plan to identify radiological data 
elements that need to be incorporated in an all-hazards patient management, tracking and 
reporting system for human health surveillance.
Conclusion
The JEE process provided a candid and open opportunity for the U.S. government to 
carefully consider public health capability and capacity gaps in response to radiation 
emergencies. The CDC Radiation Studies Branch became the focal point and led the CDC 
effort in the self-assessment process. On a scale from 1-lowest to 5-highest, the CDC gave 
the USG a score of 3 in both of the indicators relevant to the human health aspects of 
preparedness for radiation emergencies. The Joint External Evaluation Team agreed with the 
self-assessment and provided some clear recommendations for filling the identified gaps. 
CDC is working to implement a post-JEE roadmap to address these priority actions in 
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partnership with national and international partners to fill these gaps to improve its radiation 
emergency preparedness posture.
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